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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 The State charged twenty-four-year-old Christopher Cruz with one count of first-
degree murder and one count of attempted first-degree murder.  The State later filed a 
motion in limine requesting the district court rule Mr. Cruz’s statements in certain jail 
telephone conversations were admissible.  After conducting a hearing, the district court 
determined the seven phone conversation excerpts requested by the State were 
admissible.  Mr. Cruz subsequently entered into a conditional plea agreement and 
pleaded guilty to amended charges of one count of second-degree murder.  The 
conditional plea reserved Mr. Cruz’s right to appeal the district court’s decisions made 
before the plea.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of forty years, with 
eighteen years fixed. 
 On appeal, Mr. Cruz asserts the district court abused its discretion when it 
allowed the admission of two of the phone conversation excerpts from the State’s 
motion in limine. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 When Mr. Cruz was at his home in Heyburn, Jared McNeil and Craig Short 
arrived there by car.  (Supp. R., p.13.)1  While in or near the garage, Mr. Cruz shot 
Mr. Short three times with a pistol, and Mr. Short died.  (Supp. R., p.13.)  Mr. McNeil 
witnessed the shooting.  (Supp. R., p.13.)  Mr. Cruz tried to prevent Mr. McNeil from 
leaving, but Mr. McNeil eventually left.  (Supp. R., p.13.)  Mr. Cruz and his girlfriend, 
                                            
1 All citations to the “Supp. R.” refer to the 120-page PDF electronic version of the 
Supplemental Record. 
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Stephanie Juarez, fled to Texas.  (Supp. R., p.13.)  They were later taken into custody 
and returned to Idaho.  (Supp. R., p.13.)  In a police interview, Mr. Cruz reported he had 
consumed methamphetamine and acid the morning of the incident.  (See State’s Ex. 35 
(transcript of Oct. 13, 2013 interview), p.37, Ls.1-9.)  In a subsequent interview with 
detectives, Mr. Cruz stated he “woke up a little bit paralyzed.”  (State’s Ex. 35, p.37, 
Ls.11-13.) 
 Later, during the presentence investigation, Mr. Cruz stated he had been 
sleeping in his bedroom that day, when he was awakened by a loud noise.  (Supp. 
R., p.14.)  He saw a person, later identified as Mr. Short, stumble into his bedroom.  
(Supp. R., p.14.)  Mr. Cruz quickly got up and retrieved a pistol from his dresser.  (Supp. 
R., p.14.)  Mr. Short then ran out to the garage, and Mr. Cruz ran after him.  (Supp. 
R., p.14.)  When Mr. Cruz reached the garage, he fired the pistol at Mr. Short, who was 
running outside.  (Supp. R., p.14.)  Mr. Short stopped at the driver’s side door of the car 
and turned around.  (Supp. R., p.14.)  Mr. Cruz fired the pistol until it ran out of bullets.  
(Supp. R., p.14.)  Mr. Cruz then saw Mr. McNeil and asked him for help.  (Supp. 
R., p.14.)  Although Mr. Cruz attempted to make him stay, Mr. McNeil ran away.  (Supp. 
R., p.14.) 
 Conversely, in the preliminary hearing in this case, Mr. McNeil testified he and 
Mr. Short went to Mr. Cruz’s home to pick up a bag of clothing.  (Supp. R., p.13.)  While 
Mr. Short waited outside the home, Mr. Cruz met Mr. McNeil and let him in to get the 
bag of clothing.  (Supp. R., p.13.)  When Mr. McNeil walked out, he noticed a speaker in 
the garage that belonged to him and told Mr. Cruz he was going to take the speaker.  
(Supp. R., p.13.)  Mr. Cruz stated that was fine.  (Supp. R., p.13.)  Mr. McNeil took the 
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speaker out to the car, and he heard a gunshot as he was moving items in the car to 
make room for the speaker.  (Supp. R., p.13).  Mr. McNeil looked up and saw Mr. Cruz 
shoot Mr. Short multiple times with a pistol.  (Supp. R., p.13.)  Mr. McNeil testified 
Mr. Cruz then pointed the pistol at him and tried to shoot, but the pistol was out of 
bullets.  (Supp. R., p.13.)  Despite Mr. Cruz’s attempts to stop him, Mr. McNeil ran 
away.  (Supp. R., p.14.) 
 The State charged Mr. Cruz by Information with one count of first-degree murder, 
felony, Idaho Code §§ 18-4001, 18-4002 and 18-4003, one count of attempted first-
degree murder, felony, I.C. §§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003 and 18-306, and a deadly 
weapon sentencing enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 19-2520.  (R., pp.74-79; see 
R., pp.177-82.)  Mr. Cruz entered a not guilty plea to all counts.  (R., pp.89-90.) 
 The State later filed a motion in limine, requesting the district court determine 
Mr. Cruz’s statements in certain jail telephone conversations were admissible into 
evidence pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) as statements made by a party-
opponent.  (R., pp.208-10.)  The State ultimately requested the district court determine 
statements in seven excerpts from Mr. Cruz’s phone conversations were admissible 
under Rule 801(d)(2).  (R., pp.278-80; see R., pp.240-42.) 
 Mr. Cruz filed an objection to the State’s motion in limine.  (R., pp.218-22.)  
Among his arguments, Mr. Cruz asserted if the statements were determined to be 
relevant, they were unduly prejudicial.  (R., pp.220-21.) 
 At a hearing the district court conducted on the State’s motion in limine, the 
district court addressed Excerpt No. 4 from Mr. Cruz’s jail telephone conversations, 
which was as follows: 
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Christopher Cruz:  I know what happened too. 
 
Christina Cruz [Mr. Cruz’s mother]:  Well, I don’t believe you were there by 
yourself.  The whole world believes what I believe, and that’s because 
they know you.  You’re sticking up for somebody, and I think that’s bullshit. 
 
Christopher Cruz:  Well, wait until you see the evidence.  Wait till you see 
what kind of monster I am deep down inside. 
 
Christina Cruz:  You are not a monster. Did you hear me? 
 
(Tr. D-1699, Oct. 23, 2013, p.8, Ls.3-13; see Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.40, Ls.1-11; 
R., p.328.)2 
 The State argued the above “basically is Mr. Cruz characterizing his actions 
based on the evidence that will be presented that he thinks will be presented at the time 
of trial.”  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.40, Ls.16-20.)  The State further argued Mr. Cruz was 
characterizing “his consciousness of guilt and talking directly about the evidence to his 
mother . . . .”  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.40, Ls.21-24.) 
 Regarding excerpt No. 4, Mr. Cruz’s defense counsel was concerned with unfair 
prejudice:  “Mr. Cruz stating that he is a monster, we have grave concerns that if a jury 
hears that, they are going to automatically convict.  They are going to conclude that the 
charge of first degree murder is true and accurate, which we don’t believe it is.”  
(Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.41, Ls.6-13.)  After asserting the statement was not relevant, 
defense counsel asked, “[a]re we going to have a conviction based on statement rather 
than evidence, Your Honor?  So we would, as strong as possible, object to that of unfair 
                                            
2 At the hearing, the State explained the program it used to print the jail telephone 
conversation transcripts set off the pagination, meaning there was confusion about the 
page numbers.  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.34, Ls.5-15.)  Like the district court (e.g., 
Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.29, L.21 – p.30, L.15, p.33, Ls.18-33), this brief will refer to the page 
numbers at the center bottom of the pages in the phone conversation transcripts. 
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prejudice.”  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.41, Ls.15-22.)  Defense counsel further asserted, “[a]nd 
if my client’s going to be convicted, we would like to see it be done on the evidence and 
not that statement, Your Honor.”  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.41, Ls.23-25.) 
 The district court determined Excerpt No. 4 was relevant.  (See Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, 
p.42, Ls.2-4.)  While the district court stated “it does run the risk of being unfairly 
prejudicial because it could be just an offhand comment,” the district court then 
determined “[t]he real gist of this proffer from the state is that at line 9 and line 10 where 
Mr. Cruz states, ‘Well, wait until you see the evidence.’  That is the real essence of this.”  
(Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.42, Ls.8-13.)  The district court determined Mr. Cruz’s 
“characterization of the evidence is less important, although it does show his, or it may 
be argued that it shows his, consciousness of the magnitude of his conduct.”  
(Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.42, Ls.13-17.)  The district court thought “on balance, it is 
prejudicial, but I don’t think it’s unfairly prejudicial.  It is his own statement, and so the 
state may present this segment which we’ve marked as No. 4 as presented.”  
(Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.42, Ls.18-21; see R. p.328.) 
 The district court also addressed Excerpt No. 6 from Mr. Cruz’s jail telephone 
conversations, which was as follows: 
Christopher Cruz:  . . . [T]here’s a lot of inconsistencies with me too.  Well, 
I pretty much said pretty much the truth, but I justified all my actions.  Like, 
I said I was under the influence at first, but they have my blood anyway, so 
they could do the test that I wasn’t on methamphetamines, or I didn’t have 
it in my blood system or other different types of drugs besides THC.  But I 
admitted to that, I smoke pot every now and then sometimes.  It’s no 
big deal. 
 
(Tr. D-1705, Nov. 21, 2013, p.6, L.6 – p.7, L.14; see Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.45, L.13 – 
p.46, L.2, R., p.329.) 
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 The State argued Mr. Cruz was “specifically speaking about the incident.  He is 
specifically speaking about how he lied to justify his actions.  How he wasn’t originally 
on drugs or he wasn’t on drugs during the murder.  And he is stating he wasn’t on drugs 
during the murder.”  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.46, Ls.9-14.) 
 Mr. Cruz objected on the basis of “relevance [and] unfair prejudice.”  (Tr., Dec. 5, 
2014, p.46, L.21.)  Additionally, Mr. Cruz’s defense counsel raised concerns regarding 
the “last two sentences about the possible drug use, again, I think the Court has to look 
at [Rule] 404(b).  If he is going to be convicted, it needs to be what is presented and not 
for allegations or his statements that he recreationally used marijuana every now and 
then.”  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.46, L.24 – p.47, L.2.)  Defense counsel asserted “that 
statement should be stricken.”  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, Ls.2-4.)  
 Defense counsel further asserted that if Mr. Cruz “testified or told the detective 
this information, the detective should be the one testifying, not this, Your Honor.”  
(Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, Ls.5-7.)  In response to the district court’s questions, the State 
related that Mr. Cruz, in an interview with the detectives, “stated that he was high on 
acid, and then he took a needle of meth and shot up and got even higher so he was at a 
paralyzed state I believe he stated.”  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, Ls.8-16.)  The State also 
answered that Excerpt No. 6 would directly contradict what Mr. Cruz told the detectives 
in the interview.  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, Ls.17-20.) 
 The district court then determined Excerpt No. 6 was relevant.  (Tr., Dec. 5, 
2014, p.47, Ls.22-25.)  The district court also determined “it is prejudicial, but not unduly 
prejudicial.  They are statements made both in this instance and in the interview with the 
detectives by the defendant and they relate to his statements that appear to have been 
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offered initially in the interview with the detectives as justification regarding his conduct 
or his alleged conduct.”  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, L.25 – p.48, L.7.)  Thus, the district 
court determined “No. 6 is admissible, and will be able to be presented to the jury if the 
state wishes to do so.”  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.48, Ls.8-10; see R., p.329.) 
 Additionally, the district court determined the other five jail telephone 
conversation excerpts were admissible because they were relevant and their probative 
value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  (R., pp.326-30.) 
 Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Cruz later agreed to plead guilty to 
amended charges of one count of second-degree murder, felony, I.C. §§ 18-4001, 18-
4002 and 18-4003.  (R., pp.331-50.)  The State agreed to dismiss the attempted first-
degree murder count and the deadly weapon sentencing enhancement.  (R., p.340.)  
Mr. Cruz reserved his “right to appeal any decisions of trial court made prior to entry of 
plea.”  (R., p.341.)  The district court later imposed a unified sentence of forty years, 
with eighteen years fixed.  (R., pp.413-15.)   
 Mr. Cruz filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of 
Conviction and Order of Commitment.  (R., pp.421-24.)   
 Mr. Cruz also filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35.  (Supp. R., pp.19-32.)  The district court entered an Order Denying the 
Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35.  
(Supp. R., pp.12-18.)  On appeal, Mr. Cruz does not challenge the district court’s denial 
of his Rule 35 motion. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the admission of Excerpt No. 4 
and Excerpt No. 6? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The Admission Of Excerpt 





 Mr. Cruz asserts the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the 
admission of Excerpt No. 4 and Excerpt No. 6, because it did not act consistently with 
the applicable legal standards.  The district court abused its discretion when it allowed 
Excerpt No. 4, because the danger of unfair prejudice from Mr. Cruz’s characterization 
of himself as a “monster” substantially outweighed the statement’s probative value 
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403.  The district court abused its discretion when it 
allowed Excerpt No. 6, because it did not articulate a non-propensity purpose for the 
admission of the statements on Mr. Cruz’s other acts of drug use under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 404(b).  Thus, the district court’s order allowing the admission of the jail 
telephone conversation excerpts should be reversed with respect to Excerpt No. 4 and 
Excerpt No. 6, Mr. Cruz’s judgment of conviction should be vacated, and the case 
should be remanded to the district court. 
 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
 
 A district court has broad discretion when ruling on a motion in limine, and an 
appellate court reviews the district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine 
for abuse of discretion.  State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 528 (2014).  When a 
district court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine:  (1) whether the district court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the 
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boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason.  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). 
 In its motion in limine, the State sought to admit Mr. Cruz’s statements in Excerpt 
No. 4 and Excerpt No. 6 as statements of a party-opponent under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2).  (E.g,, R., pp.278-79.)  Statements of a party-opponent are not 
hearsay.  I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A).  But nonhearsay evidence, like statements of a party-
opponent, “may be excluded on other grounds, such as if [it] constitutes propensity 
evidence under I.R.E. 404(b).”   See Cook v. State, 157 Idaho 775, 779 (Ct. App. 2014).   
 Relevant evidence is generally admissible.  I.R.E. 402.  Evidence is relevant if it 
has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.  I.R.E. 401.  However, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury.  I.R.E. 403; State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009).  An 
appellate court reviews a Rule 403 balancing determination by the district court for an 
abuse of discretion.  Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.   
 Additionally, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person to show action in conformity therewith, but may be admissible 
for other purposes.  I.R.E. 404(b).  Admissibility of other acts evidence when offered for 
a permitted purpose is subject to a two-tiered analysis.  Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.  First, 
the district court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the 
other act as fact.  Id.  The district court must also determine if the fact, if established, 
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would be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other 
than propensity.  Id.  Second, the district court must engage in a Rule 403 balancing 
and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence.  Id.  As discussed above, this balancing is committed to 
the discretion of the district court.  Id.  The district court must determine each of these 
considerations of admissibility on a case-by-case basis.  Id. 
  
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Excerpt No. 4, 
 Because Under Rule 403 The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice Substantially 
 Outweighed The Statement’s Probative Value  
 
 Mr. Cruz asserts the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the 
admission of Excerpt No. 4, because under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 the danger of 
unfair prejudice from Mr. Cruz’s characterization of himself as a “monster” substantially 
outweighed the statement’s probative value. 
 Excerpt No. 4 included Mr. Cruz’s statement:  “Well, wait until you see the 
evidence.  Wait till you see what kind of monster I am deep down inside.”  (Tr., D-1699, 
p.8, Ls.9-11.)  Although Mr. Cruz raised concerns with unfair prejudice (Tr., Dec. 5, 
2014, p.41, Ls.6-25), and the district court initially noted “it does run the risk of being 
unfairly prejudicial because it could be just an offhand comment,” (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, 
p.42, Ls.8-10), the district court ultimately determined “on balance, it is prejudicial, but I 
don’t think it’s unfairly prejudicial.”  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.42, Ls.18-20.)  However, the 
danger of unfair prejudice from the statement substantially outweighed the statement’s 
probative value. 
 As explained above, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  I.R.E. 403.  The Idaho 
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Supreme Court has held that “[t]he fact that evidence may cause an emotional reaction 
in the jury does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the evidence should be 
excluded.”  State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 67 (2011).  The proper focus of the district 
court is not upon merely prejudicial evidence but upon unfair prejudice; “whether fact to 
be shown by the evidence justifies the tendency of the evidence to persuade by 
illegitimate means.”  State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 604 (1991) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Thus, “evidence should be excluded if it invites inordinate appeal to 
lines of reasoning outside of the evidence or emotions which are irrelevant to the 
decision making process.”  Id. 
 Here, the probative value of Mr. Cruz’s statement characterizing himself as a 
“monster” was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, because it 
invited inordinate appeal to lines of reasoning outside of the evidence and to emotions 
which are irrelevant to the decision making process.  See id.  As Mr. Cruz’s defense 
counsel asserted, if the jury heard the statement, “they are going to automatically 
convict.”  (See Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.41, Ls.9-11.)  The statement would prompt the jury 
to convict Mr. Cruz on his self-description, not on the evidence presented by the State.  
(See Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.41, Ls.11-13, 19-20.)  Thus, even though the statement may 
have been relevant to Mr. Cruz’s characterization of the evidence and consciousness of 
guilt (see Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.42, Ls.4-17), on balance the facts to be shown by the 
statement did not justify the tendency of the statement to persuade by illegitimate 
means.  Cf. Rhoades, 119 Idaho at 604.   
 The probative value of Mr. Cruz’s statement characterizing himself as a 
“monster” was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  See I.R.E. 
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403.  Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the admission of 
Excerpt No. 4, because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards.  
See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600. 
 
D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Excerpt No. 6, 
 Because It Did Not Articulate Under Rule 404(b) A Non-Propensity Purpose For 
 The Admission Of The Statements On Mr. Cruz’s Other Acts Of Drug Use  
 
 Mr. Cruz asserts the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the 
admission of Excerpt No. 6, because it did not articulate under Idaho Rule of Evidence 
404(b) a non-propensity purpose for the admission of the statements on Mr. Cruz’s 
other acts of drug use.   
 Excerpt No. 6 included Mr. Cruz’s statement that he admitted to having THC in 
his blood system, followed by:  “I smoke pot every now and then sometimes.  It’s no big 
deal.”  (Tr., D-1705, p.7, Ls.11-14.)  At the hearing on the State’s motion in limine, 
Mr. Cruz asserted the district court had to look at Rule 404(b) with respect to those two 
statements.  (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.46, Ls.21-24.)  However, the district court determined 
the entirety of Excerpt No. 6 was admissible, without striking the statements as Mr. Cruz 
had requested.  (See Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, L.22 – p.48, L.10.)  Further, the district 
court did not articulate under Rule 404(b) a non-propensity purpose for the admission of 
the statements on Mr. Cruz’s other acts of drug use.  (See Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, L.22 
– p.48, L.10; R., p.328.)   
 As a preliminary matter, evidence of Mr. Cruz’s other acts of drug use, because it 
implicated Mr. Cruz’s character and was not intrinsic to the crimes charged, was subject 
to the strictures of Rule 404(b).  See State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 949 (Ct. App. 
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2012).  Thus, the district court needed to conduct a full Rule 404(b) admissibility 
analysis on the other acts of drug use statements.  See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.   
 For the second step of the first tier in the Rule 404(b) admissibility analysis—the 
determination that the other act would be relevant—the trial court must articulate the 
purpose or purposes, other than propensity, for admission of the evidence.  In Grist, the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court, when it admitted other acts evidence, 
did not “articulate whether the evidence was probative because it demonstrated the 
existence of a common scheme or plan or because it tended to otherwise corroborate [a 
complaining witness’] testimony.”3  Grist, 147 Idaho at 53.  Because “trial courts must 
carefully scrutinize evidence offered as ‘corroboration’ or as demonstrating a ‘common 
scheme or plan’ in order to avoid the erroneous introduction of evidence that is merely 
probative of the defendant’s propensity to engage in criminal behavior,” the Grist Court 
vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.  Id.; cf. 
State v. Marks, 156 Idaho 559, 565 (Ct. App. 2014) (“Here, the district court identified 
the purposes, permissible under Rule 404(b), for which it found the evidence relevant.”) 
 Because the district court in this case did not articulate a non-propensity purpose 
for admission of the statements on Mr. Cruz’s other acts of drug use, the district court 
did not satisfy the second step of the first tier in the Rule 404(b) admissibility analysis.  
See Grist, 147 Idaho at 53; see also State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230 (2008) 
(holding, with respect to the notice requirement of Rule 404(b), that “compliance with 
I.R.E. 404(b) is mandatory and a condition precedent to admission of other acts 
                                            
3 The district court in Grist also “did not determine whether there was sufficient evidence 
to establish as fact [the defendant’s] prior uncharged sexual misconduct . . . .”  Grist, 
147 Idaho at 53. 
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evidence”).  Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the admission 
of Excerpt No. 6, because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards.  
See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, Mr. Cruz respectfully requests this Court reverse the 
district court’s order allowing the admission of the jail telephone conversation excerpts 
with respect to Excerpt No. 4 and Excerpt No. 6, vacate Mr. Cruz’s judgment of 
conviction, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 2nd day of August, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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